Security without Safety: Queering Cybersecurity in the Age of Digital Transnational Repression

Abstract

Exiled activists increasingly face government-sponsored digital threats, including surveillance, hacking, and spyware, while residing in host states such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. This phenomenon, known as digital transnational repression (DTR), involves the use of digital technologies to track, intimidate, and silence individuals across borders. Drawing on interviews and questionnaire data with exiled women activists from Global Majority countries, this article focuses on a subset of participants who identify as queer to analyze how intersecting identities of gender and sexual orientation shape their experiences of DTR. We found that exiled queer activists were targeted with spyware and phishing, alongside threats of gendered violence, sexualized harassment and smear campaigns. Situating our analysis within an intersectional feminist framework, we analyze the experiences of exiled queer activists targeted with DTR and identify a critical protection gap that mainstream cybersecurity frameworks and technical-oriented approaches to DTR do not address the associated state-sponsored identity-based attacks and the social, reputational, and psychological harms caused by these threats. We conclude by adopting a duty of care framework, to reconceptualize the defense against DTR, moving beyond digital security toward safety.